A key issue in cognitive neuroscience concerns the neural representation of conceptual knowledge. Currently, debate focuses around the issue of whether there are neural regions specialised for the processing of specific semantic attributes or categories, or whether concepts are represented in an undifferentiated neural system. Neuropsychological studies of patients with selective semantic deficits and previous neuroimaging studies do not unequivocally support either account. We carried out a PET study to determine whether there is any regional specialisation for the processing of concepts from different semantic categories using picture stimuli and a semantic categorisation task. We found robust activation of a large semantic network extending from left inferior frontal cortex into the inferior temporal lobe and including occipital cortex and the fusiform gyrus. The only category effect that we found was additional activation for animals in the right occipital cortex, which we interpret as being due to the extra visual processing demands required in order to differentiate one animal from another. We also carried out analyses in specific cortical regions that have been claimed to be preferentially activated for various categories, but found no evidence of any differential activation as a function of category. We interpret these data within the framework of cognitive accounts in which conceptual knowledge is represented within a nondifferentiated distributed system.
INTRODUCTION
Patients who show category-specific semantic impairments following brain damage raise important issues about the organisation of conceptual knowledge. Typically, such patients have disproportionate difficulty with living things (e.g., animals, fruits/vegetables) although deficits for artefact concepts (e.g., tools, vehicles) have also been reported, albeit less frequently (see Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, & Giustolisi, 1995; Saffran & Schwartz, 1994 , for reviews). Such deficits raise the issue of how conceptual knowledge is organised such that damage can lead to deficits for a specific category or domain of knowledge.
Various theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain such deficits. According to one influential account, the neural substrate for the representation of animate objects such as animals and plant life is evolutionarily adapted and independent of the areas involved in the processing of other categories of knowledge (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) , although the account makes no assumptions regarding which anatomical regions subserve each domain. Thus, certain entities (such as animals and plant life) have played a special role in human evolution, and this has lead to their representation by distinct neural mechanisms. However, attempts to locate neural substrates that are specific to living things have proved difficult. For example, although lesion studies show some broad correlations between medial temporal and associated temporal neocortex damage and a living things deficit, there are patients who do not show this pattern (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Perani et al., 1995) . For example, Caramazza and Shelton' s patient, EW, has a selective deficit for animals as a result of damage in the left posterior frontal and parietal lobes. Living things deficits have also been reported in patients with Alzheimer's dementia, where cortical damage is arguably patchy and widespread (Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Watson, Powis, Patterson, & Hodges, 2001; Garrard, Patterson, Watson, & Hodges, 1998; Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991) .
Category-specific deficits have also been explained as evidence for the existence of separate stores of knowledge for different types of semantic features-e.g., sensory and functional features (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983) and features corresponding to visual form and motion (Martin, 2001; Martin & Chao, 2001 ). On the sensoryfunctional account, damage to the store of sensory knowledge leads to a disproportionate deficit for living things since these concepts are more dependent upon sensory than functional features. In contrast, damage to the store of functional knowledge has a greater effect on artefact concepts since these are more dependent upon functional information (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983 , 1987 Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . The sensoryfunctional account has been questioned on a number of grounds. Patients have been reported with a living things deficit who show equal impairments for visual/perceptual and functional properties. It is possible that the greater deficits for sensory properties associated with living things impairments in some of the earlier studies was due to the greater difficulty of the sensory property questions for living things (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) . Similarly, in the few reported cases of patients with artefact deficits who have been tested on the relevant contrasts, there is either no difference between sensory and functional properties , or an effect in the reverse direction (Lambon Ralph, Howard, Nightingale, & Ellis, 1998) . Moreover, we have argued elsewhere that the contribution of functional information to the concepts of living things has been underestimated due to an overly narrow definition of what counts as a functional property. For example, animals have important biological functions, such as running, breathing, eating, and so on, that are central to our conceptual knowledge of this domain (see , for a discussion), but which tend to be overlooked in analyses of their properties. Finally, recent neuroimaging studies have shown no consistent differences in cortical activation as a function of sensory or functional properties (Devlin et al. 2002b; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2001; Moore & Price, 1999; Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti, Gorno-Tempini, Cappa, & Fazio, 1999; Spitzer et al., 1998) .
A modified version of the sensory-functional account has recently been proposed by Martin and colleagues (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Martin, & Chao, 2001; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996) . On the basis of neuroimaging data with healthy subjects, focusing on the object processing system, Martin, Haxby and colleagues have proposed that different object categories are represented in an extensive distributed and partially overlapping network involving the occipital, temporal, and parietal lobes and pre-motor cortex. Within this system there is some specialisation as a function of category. For example, in bilateral ventral regions of the posterior temporal lobe (fusiform gyrus), where attributes of visual form are stored, they claim that peak activation for animals is more lateral and tools more medial. On the lateral surface of the temporal lobe animals elicit more activation than tools in posterior superior temporal sulcus while posterior middle temporal activations are activated more for tools than animals. The authors stress the point that tools activate areas close to regions thought to mediate perception of artefact motion (left posterior middle temporal lobe, Martin, 2001 ) and animals activate regions associated with the perception of biological motion (superior temporal sulcus: Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998) , although this latter effect was only observed in approximately half the subjects tested (Martin & Chao, 2001) .
However, this account also has its problems. Even though increased activation for tools in the left posterior middle temporal lobe is the most robust finding (e.g., Chao et al., 1999; Martin et al., 1996; Moore & Price, 1999; Perani et al., 1999) , not all studies show this effect (Devlin et al., 2002b; Grabowski, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Perani et al., 1995) . A recent meta-analysis of seven PET studies also identified an effect in left posterior middle temporal lobe, which was stronger for tools than other man-made items such as vehicles (Devlin et al., 2002a) . However, the region was not tool-specific but also responded during motion relative to perceptual decisions for fruits, and furthermore, naming body parts produced more activation here than naming tools, animals, or faces. Indeed, the most striking finding in the neuroimaging studies of category and domain specificity is that most categories activate the same neural regions with only weak and inconsistent category-specific effects.
In contrast to these accounts, which assume some degree of neural specialisation for semantic information, we have recently argued that category-specific deficits can emerge as a function of the content and structure of concepts within a nondifferentiated distributed neural system (Durrant-Peatfield, Tyler, Moss, & Levy, 1997; Tyler, Moss, DurrantPeatfield, & Levy, 2000) . Our claim is that concepts vary in number and type of features, in the degree to which those features are shared or distinctive, and in the strength of the correlations between different features. Correlated features support each other with mutual activation and thus are more resistant to damage than features without this support. This distributed neural system involves a number of brain areas including frontal, temporal, parietal, and occipital regions.
Temporal regions are clearly critically involved in the representation and processing of concepts, with other cortical regions more or less involved depending on a number of factors, such as the nature of the input (e.g., spoken, written, pictures), the nature of the task (e.g., naming, reading, matching) and the additional nonlinguistic cognitive demands required. Within this system, category-specific deficits will emerge because some concepts are more robust to damage than others due to their internal structure. Specifically, for living things, shared properties (e.g., eyes, legs) are numerous and densely intercorrelated, while distinctive properties (e.g., a zebra' s stripes, a lion' s mane) are fewer and weakly correlated with other properties of the concept. In contrast, the distinctive properties of artefacts are supported by form-function correlations (e.g., blade-cut, handle-turn), while the shared properties are fewer and less intercorrelated. It is through this disadvantage for distinctive relative to shared properties of living things over artefacts that the disproportionate living things deficit emerges. This account predicts no specialised activation for different categories in the normal brain, as long as the materials are carefully matched on variables such as familiarity and visual complexity.
In a recent series of PET and fMRI studies, using written words and matching items across categories (animals, fruits, tools, and vehicles) and domains on the crucial variables of frequency, letter length, and visual complexity, we found no neural specialisation for the processing of any category or domain. We used two tasks-lexical decision and semantic categorisation-and found that all categories of knowledge activated a common extensive neural system, primarily in the left hemisphere, involving the inferior frontal cortex, inferior and middle temporal gyri, and the temporal pole (Devlin et al., 2002b) . We argued, on the basis of these results, that the conceptual system is represented in a distributed neural network with no differentiation as a function of category or domain. However, it could be argued that since our imaging studies used written words rather than pictures they did not tap directly into the object processing network, and that the strongest evidence for a COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, 2003, 20 (3/4/5/6) 543 DISTRIBUTED NEURAL SEMANTIC SYSTEM differentiated semantic neural system comes from work on the object processing system in the ventral temporal lobes (Martin & Chao, 2001; Martin et al., 1996) .
We thus carried out a study using the same paradigm (semantic categorisation) as in our earlier experiments (Devlin et al., 2002b) but used pictures instead of written words. Our secondary aim was to evaluate claims for category-specificity made by Martin and colleagues by including the same categories that feature in many of their studies (animals and tools). Since these categories vary on a number of dimensions, most notably in their visual complexity, we added two more categories (vehicles and fruits/vegetables), so that we could match living and nonliving things on visual complexity. Thus, within the living things domain we included a visually simple (fruits/vegetables) and visually complex (animals) category, and within the nonliving domain there was a visually complex (vehicles) and visually simple (tools) category.
Given the dangers of both statistical leniency and conservatism, we took a multi-analysis approach to analysing our imaging data by conducting our analyses at two levels of threshold. In the first analysis, we adopted a conservative threshold of p = .05 after correcting for multiple comparisons (Worsley, Marrett, Neelin, Vandal, Friston, & Evans, 1996) in order to reduce the possibility of obtaining false positives. In a second set of analyses we took a more lenient approach and lowered our statistical threshold substantially (to an uncorrected level of p = .05) in order to maximise our chances of detecting any small category effects.
METHODS

Subjects
We tested nine right-handed, male native English speakers whose mean age was 28 years (range: 21-43 years). Each gave informed consent and they were medically screened for PET prior to entering the scanning room.
Stimuli and design
For this study, we modified the semantic categorisation task that we had previously used with written words (Devlin et al., 2002b; Tyler, Russell, Fadili, & Moss, 2001 ) so that it could be used with picture stimuli. In the picture version of the task, subjects saw three cue pictures presented sequentially in the centre of a computer screen and made a speeded same/different decision as to whether a fourth (target) picture belonged to the same subcategory. For example, subjects might see cue pictures of a sheep, a pig, and a horse followed by a target picture of a donkey, to which they would respond "same." On another trial, they might see the cue pictures of a butterfly, a caterpillar, and a beetle followed by the target picture of a cow, to which they would respond "different."
The pictures (which were all coloured photographs) came from one of four categories: two were from the domain of natural kinds (animals; vegetables & fruit) and two were from the domain of nonliving things (tools; vehicles). Stimuli within each of the four categories were sorted into subcategories. For example, items within the animal category were subcategorised into birds, mammals, and insects. We constructed triplets out of these subcategories, enabling us to construct "different" trials in which the target was from a different subcategory, but within the main category. Thus, the cue and target pictures (whether in "same" or "different" trials) were always from the same category. Within each category there were equal numbers of same and different trials. The triples and their targets were pre-tested to ensure that, across the categories, they were equally semantically related (see Semantic Relatedness Pre-test below).
The cue triples and targets in each category were matched as closely as possible on familiarity using the MRC Psycholinguistic databases (Coltheart, 1981) and our own norms (see Table 1 ). Since pictures vary in their visual complexity, and this in turn can affect naming and decision latencies (Gaffan & Haywood, 1993; Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992) , we attempted to match the pictures within the two domains on this variable. Items within the categories of tools and fruits/vegetables TYLER ET AL.
were more visually simple than pictures of animals and vehicles, as determined by our rating pre-tests carried out on 17 subjects. Thus, the tools and fruits/vegetables were matched on rated visual complexity, as were the vehicles and animals (see Table 1 ).
We also constructed a baseline consisting of sets of quadruples of meaningless, simple shapes made up of combinations of small squares, varying the colour and number of squares in each object. A set of three simple shapes were presented sequentially and followed by a target shape that was either from the same "family" of shapes or from a different family (see Figure 1 for examples). All items (both test and baseline) were scaled to the same size and pre-tested for relatedness in the same way as the test items (see above). There were 96 picture trials and 48 baseline trials.
Semantic relatedness pre-test
Semantic relatedness was determined by means of a pre-test in which we presented each cue triplet followed by its target to 11 subjects and asked them to decide the relatedness of each triplet to its target, using a scale of 1-7, where 1 was very unrelated and 7 was very related. For the same sets we rejected any quadruple with a mean relatedness score of less than 5.5. The mean relatedness score for the final same set of items in each of the categories was: animals = 6.3; vehicles = 6.11; tools = 6.31; fruits = 6.39; baseline = 6.11; F(1, 10) = 1.539, p = .209.
Procedure
The three cue stimuli were displayed against a white background. The fourth stimulus was framed by a thin black line to indicate that it was the target and that subjects were required to make a response. Each trial lasted 4416 ms, with each stimulus presented for 400 ms, separated by a 200 ms interval. There was then a 2217 ms interval between the presentation of the target and the first cue of the following trial. Subjects made a same response by pressing the left mouse button and a different response by pressing the right mouse button. We delivered the stimuli and recorded latencies and error rates using the DMDX software (Forster & Forster, 1991) . Stimuli were presented within the first 53 s of each 90 s scan to coincide with the critical period of tracer uptake and thus optimise the sensitivity of the design (Silbersweig et al., 1993) . Within each 53 s period we presented a block of 12 trials. In total, each subject received 12 scans of 90 s, 2 from each of the 4 categories (vehicles, tools, animals, fruits & vegetables) and 4 from the baseline condition. The scan order was varied across sessions and subjects.
Scans were performed at the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre in Cambridge, England on a GE Advance PET Scanner (General Electric Medical Systems, Milwaukee, Wisconsin). It comprises 18 rings of crystals, which results in 35 image planes, each 4.25 mm thick. The axial field-of-view is 15.3 cm, thus allowing for whole brain acquisition. Each subject received a bolus of 300 MBq of H 2 O 15 before each scan for a total radiation exposure of 4.2 mSv. The emission data was acquired with the septa retracted (3D mode) and reconstructed using the PROMIS algorithm (Kinahan & Rogers, 1989) with an unapodised Colsher filter. Corrections were applied for randoms, scatter, attenuation and dead time. The voxel sizes were 2.34, 2.34, and 4.25 mm.
RESULTS
Behavioural data
The subjects' raw RT data was inverse transformed prior to statistical analysis in order to reduce the effects of outliers (Ulrich & Miller, 1994) . There were no significant differences in the mean RTs in the four semantic conditions: animals = 805 ms, fruits/vegetables = 811 ms, tools = 822 ms, vehicles = 811 ms, F 2 (3, 95) < 1, p = .907 . However, these RTs were slower than the mean RT for the baseline of 775 ms, F 2 (4, 143) = 2.971, p = .022. An analysis of the errors showed that there were no significant differences in error rates between any of the five conditions, F 2 (4, 134) = 1.2, p = .301. RTs were also not affected by the visual complexity of the pictures, F 2 (1, 95) = 1.180, p = .280.
Imaging data
The functional images were realigned using SPM (Friston et al., 1995 ; SPM99, Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Translation and rotation corrections did not exceed 4 mm and 3°, respectively, for any of the participants. The mean image created by the realignment procedure was used to determine the parameters for transforming the images onto the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) mean brain. These parameters were then applied to the functional images Ashburner, Neelin, Collins, Evans, & Friston, 1997) and the image was resampled into isotropic 2 mm 3 voxels. Finally, each image was smoothed with a 16 mm at fullwidth half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian filter. The SPM software was used to compute a withinsubjects analysis (fixed-effects) using the general linear model (Friston, Holmes, Worsley, Poline, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1995b) . Results are reported at a p < .05 level after correcting for multiple comparisons (Worsley et al., 1996) .
Semantic activations
To determine the semantic network activated by the combined set of categories, we contrasted all semantic categories against baseline (animals,
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vehicles, fruits/vegetables, tools minus baseline). There were two very large clusters of activation (one of over 13,000 voxels) that were significant at a threshold of p < .05. To identify individual peaks within these large clusters the contrast was run at a raised uncorrected threshold of p = .0001. This broke the cluster into several separate regions, which are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2 .
We found large clusters of activation in the LH stretching from the inferior/middle occipital gyrus through the anterior part of the fusiform (BA37), and extending laterally into the middle and superior temporal cortex. There was also significant activation in the inferior and medial frontal cortex, including Broca' s area and anterior portions of the cingulate gyrus. Similar regions of occipital cortex and fusiform gyrus were activated in the RH, although activation did not extend as far forward into anterior regions as in the LH, and there was significant cerebellar activation. In addition, we found significant bilateral medial frontal activation.
A subsequent analysis was carried out to determine the semantic network that was commonly activated for all four categories. For this, we computed a main effect of semantic categories relative to baseline, as before, but inclusively masked it with each of the individual contrasts (animals minus baseline, fruits/vegetables minus baseline, tools minus baseline, vehicles minus baseline at an uncorrected p < .05 threshold. This ensures that the main effect for semantic categories relative to baseline will represent only those regions active for all four categories (i.e., the common semantic system). In other words, if activations were present for some but not all categories these would be excluded from the results. Once again, we found large clusters of activation and therefore we computed the same contrast at an uncorrected threshold of .0001. This broke the cluster into smaller regions, which are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3 .
One cluster of activation was located in the left fusiform extending posteriorly into the cingulate and lingual gyrus and anteriorly into the parahippocampal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus. A second large LH cluster was in the medial frontal lobe, and a third in inferior frontal gyrus, including Broca' s area. There was also significant activation in the middle frontal gyrus. In the RH, we found significant activations in the cerebellum extending into the fusiform, and also in the medial frontal lobe. There were also significant bilateral activations in the cingulate gyrus.
There was considerable overlap between the semantic network activated in the masked and unmasked analyses, suggesting that each of the four Peaks shown for all clusters significant at p < .05 using Talairach coordinates. Cluster extents are presented at a threshold of .0001. Peaks shown for all clusters significant at p < .05 using Talairach coordinates. Cluster extents are presented at an uncorrected threshold of .0001.
semantic categories activates essentially the same set of neural regions. Additional analyses were carried out to ensure that the experiment was sufficiently sensitive to detect small differences in activation, if they were present in the data. Rather than using an introspective approach that uses the voxel scores as typical observations to calculate the power of the analysis (Van Horn, Ellmore, Esposito, & Berman, 1998), we used a more stringent retrospective approach that utilises the whole data set to estimate the effect size and the proportion of active voxels. We then fit a Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC), using a finite mixture-based model, to the observed 
structural image. The image is in neurological convention (L = L). Red and yellow areas were reliably (p < .05) active at the cluster level after statistical correction. The height threshold was set at 3.89.
data (Gustard et al., 2001) . This model overcomes the binormal assumption of the classical parametric methods and can be generalised to any statistical score (Genovese, Noll, & Eddy, 1997) ; it is directly applicable in our context using either the t or the F SPMs. The data provided by the t maps given in SPM were fitted with a mixture of two t-distributions representing the t values of individual voxels under the null hypothesis (H 0 ) and under an active hypothesis (H 1 ). The algorithm provides us with the mixing proportion (the estimated proportion of activated voxels) and effect size which best fit the data. These were estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure (Gustard et al., 2001) .
Comparing semantic conditions to the baseline we found λ = .209 and δ = 2.76. That is, the mean 
The image is in neurological convention (L = L). Red and yellow areas were reliably (p < .05) active at the cluster level after statistical correction. The height threshold was set at 3.89.
effect size elicited an approximately 2.8% change in regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) and 21% of voxels were activated in this condition. The detection power was of 81% at false positives fraction (FPF) of .03.
Effects of domains
We examined domain effects by directly comparing living things with artefacts. At an uncorrected threshold of .001, one RH cluster (330 voxels) was just significant at p < .05 (see Table 4 ) for living things compared to artefacts. This was situated in the sylvian fissure between superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) and inferior parietal gyrus (BA 40), a region anterior and superior to that reported as specific to animals by Chao et al. (1999) . No further clusters were significant at this threshold for living things or for artefacts.
Effects of categories
To determine whether there were regions of the semantic network that were more activated for one category than another, we directly contrasted each semantic category against the three other semantic categories. There were no clusters significant at p < .05 for vehicles, fruits/vegetables, or tools. However, we found a region in the right inferior occipital gyrus extending into the right cerebellum that was significantly more active for animals than other categories (see Table 5 and Figure 4) . A subsequent analysis, in which we inclusively masked this contrast with the three other simple contrasts (animals minus fruits/vegetables, animals minus tools, animals minus vehicles) as well as the baseline (animals minus baseline), showed significant activation for animals in the same right inferior occipital region (see Table 6 ), suggesting that this activation was specific to animals only.
Effects of visual complexity
To determine whether activations varied as a function of the visual complexity of the stimuli, we compared the two visually complex object categories (animals, vehicles) against the two visually simple object categories (fruits/vegetables, tools). This produced a cluster of activation in right inferior occipital gyrus extending into the right inferior temporal gyrus (see Table 7 ). However, this activation was not produced by both visually complex categories (animals, vehicles) since, when we carried out a masked analysis, there were no significant activations. For the masked analysis we contrasted the two visually complex object categories with the two visually simple object categories and masked this with the four simple contrasts (animals minus fruits, animals minus tools, vehicles minus fruits, vehicles minus tools). There were no clusters significant at p < .05, suggesting that the effect of visual complexity seen in the unmasked analysis was due to only one of the categories. Comparing the activation for the unmasked visually complex categories with the activation for each of the categories individually, we see that the additional activation for visually complex categories overlaps with that found for the animals.
Summary
The results show that our task successfully activated a large network in occipital, fusiform, and frontal regions, which largely overlaps with the object processing system identified by Martin and others (Chao et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000; Martin et al., 1996) . However, unlike Martin et al., we did not find evidence for category effects in temporal cortex. Martin et al. claim that animals activate regions of lateral temporal cortex, whereas tools activate more medial regions of the temporal lobe. We found no cortical regions that were more active for tools. The only increased activation that we found for animals was in right occipital cortex, which overlapped with the additional activation we observed for visually complex stimuli. We consider the implications of these results in the Discussion.
One possible reason for this difference in results is that we were too conservative in analysing the data and thus reduced the possibility of detecting small differences in activation as a function of category. In order to test this hypothesis, we carried out additional analyses in which we lowered the threshold of our statistical maps and then plotted the activations for each category in those regions which have been claimed by Martin and colleagues to be preferentially involved in the processing of objects in different semantic categories.
Additional analyses
Sensorimotor network for tools
In a series of papers, Martin and colleagues (Chao et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000; Martin & Chao, 2001 ) have reported that in addition to activating medial fusiform regions, tools preferentially activate several cortical areas, including middle temporal gyrus (motion attributes), left ventral premotor cortex and left posterior parietal cortex, which are associated with retrieval of information about the hand movements involved in using manipulable objects. In order to determine whether the same regions were involved in processing pictures of tools in the present experiment, we carried out analyses analogous to those used by Martin et al. (Chao et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 2000) . For these analyses we obtained an SPM map for the semantics (animals, tools, vehicles, fruits) minus baseline contrast, using a very low uncorrected threshold of .05. We used this low threshold in order to detect the maximum set of voxels activated by the semantic conditions. Our next step was to locate the coordinates of the activations in left ventral pre-motor and posterior parietal regions reported in Chao and Martin (2000) , and in the left middle temporal gyrus and the bilateral medial fusiform reported in Chao et al. (1999) . We then plotted the parameter estimates of the effects of interest for each of the four categories (animals, tools, vehicles, fruits/vegetables) at each of those coordinates. These parameter estimates provide an estimate of the activation generated by each of the four categories, enabling us to determine whether tools generated the largest effects in these specific regions, as predicted by Chao, Martin, and colleagues.
In order to maximise our chances of obtaining differential activation in the regions specified by Martin and colleagues, we carried out further analyses in which we looked for differential activation in specific cortical regions rather than only focusing on individual voxels. In order to define a volume, we calculated an average coordinate based on the coordinates published in Chao and Martin (2000) and Chao et al. (1999) for a specific region. From this point of origin we selected a volume of interest (VOI) as a sphere large enough to encompass all of the coordinates for that region. We used a VOI radius of 5 mm for left ventral pre-motor and left middle temporal gyrus regions, and a radius of 4 mm for the left posterior parietal region. To increase our chances of detecting any differential effects, we again set the threshold to a very low level (p = .6). Within each volume we estimated effect sizes by comparing activations averaged across all of the voxels for each of the four categories against the baseline and applied a small volume correction (Worsley, 1996) .
Left ventral premotor.
Within the low thresholded SPM map of semantics minus baseline we located the coordinates given in Chao and Martin (2000) and plotted parameter estimates, which are shown in Figure 5a . There was no evidence of any preferential activation for tools at any of these coordinates. Rather, at each coordinate a different subset of categories produced the largest effect (as can be seen in Figure 5a ). When we tested the active voxels within the VOI in this region to determine whether tools generated more activation than the other categories, we obtained the same lack of any differential effects.
Left posterior parietal. Following the procedure described above, we also plotted effects sizes at the two peak coordinates for tools in left parietal cortex (Chao & Martin, 2000) . At one (-30,-39,47) there was no activation at all in our maps, while at the other, the categories of fruits and tools generated more activation than animals or vehicles (see Figure  5b) . The VOI analysis of activated voxels in this region showed no differential effects as a function of category.
Middle temporal gyrus. We also plotted effects size for several coordinates in left middle temporal gyrus reported in Chao et al. (1999) . Once again, we found wide variation in the effects produced by various categories at these coordinates, with a considerable degree of overlap across the categories. In the LH there tended to be a slightly larger effect for fruits at some coordinates (but not in all), whereas in comparable locations in the RH the category of vehicles tended to have a larger effect on activation. However, the most notable feature of these analyses was the absence of selective activation, the fact that most categories showed some degree of activation at almost all locations, and the variation in effect sizes for a specific category at locations differing by just a few millimeters (see Figure 5c ). Once again, the VOI analysis also showed no additional activation for tools in this region.
Animals vs. tools in the fusiform gyrus. Martin and colleagues (Chao et al., 1999) claim that animals activate the more lateral regions of the fusiform whereas tool activation is found in more medial fusiform regions. We plotted effects sizes for all four categories using the coordinates in lateral and medial fusiform reported in Chao et al., and within the VOI for these regions (calculated as spheres large enough to encompass all the coordinates for that region, using small volume correction as described in Worsley et al., 1966) . We used a VOI radius of 7 mm for left lateral and medial regions of the fusiform gyrus, 6 mm for right lateral fusiform gyrus, and 9 mm for right medial fusiform gyrus. Once again, we found no differences in the extent to which each category activated voxels in these two regions (see Figure 6 ). Direct contrasts of animals against tools within the VOI in lateral fusiform gyrus, and tools against animals within the VOI in medial fusiform gyrus, also failed to produce significant activations.
DISCUSSION
In this experiment, we found that pictures of common objects and entities activated an extensive conceptual system primarily in left occipital, temporal, and frontal regions but also including the right occipital and fusiform gyrus. Many of these areas have been reported in other studies using a variety of tasks such as silent naming, viewing, and matching to sample (e.g., Mummery, Shallice, & Price, 1999; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1999; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996) . We also found a large swathe of activation in left middle frontal gyrus extending to the anterior cingulate. Previous studies have reported increased anterior cingulate activity during conditions of high relative to low response competition (e.g., Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001) , suggesting that anterior cingulate activity most likely reflects cognitive processes that subjects invoke to minimise errors rather than as a direct response to errors. In the present study, although error in the semantic conditions was equivalent to that in the baseline condition, reaction time was significantly longer, suggesting a higher level of overall demand. Although the maximal medial prefrontal activation in the present study lay rostrally to anterior cingulate, the limited spatial resolution of PET, the imprecision of the Talairach-Tournoux coordinate system, and the fact that the observed activations extend to the anterior cingulate, suggest that our findings might also be interpreted in terms of differences in response competition across conditions.
The activations in this study largely overlap with those found in our previous study using the same task with written words (Devlin et al., 2002b ). Here we found a similar semantic network involving temporal and frontal activations, although the frontal activation was more posterior than in the present study. The major difference between the two studies was that the present study, perhaps not surprisingly given that we used pictures as stimuli, elicited more occipital activation. Thus, the semantic categorisation task, whether using words or pictures as stimuli, is sufficiently sensitive to robustly activate the neural system involved in conceptual processing. This point was reinforced by the power analyses, which showed that the experiment was highly sensitive to neural activity.
Even though the paradigm was very sensitive to neural activation, we found very little evidence for any category-specific differences. For example, a comparison of each category against the baseline condition activated essentially the same semantic network. The only category-specific activation was for animals in right inferior occipital cortex, which was slightly more lateralised and anterior than the right occipital activation for animals reported by Perani et al. (1999), and Chao et al. (1999) . However, this region cannot be considered to be specific only for the processing of pictures of animals, since Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, and Haxby (2000) have reported stronger activation in this region for faces compared to chairs and houses. These findings are consistent with a nonspecialised role of inferior occipital regions in the processing of different categories of objects.
We found considerable overlap between this region and that activated for visually complex compared to visually simple pictures. By comparing the masked and unmasked visual complexity analyses we were able to establish that the visual complexity activation came from the animal category and not from the vehicles. Given that we carefully matched the animals and vehicles on visual complexity, this result suggests that visual complexity per se cannot account fully for the differences in processing different semantic categories. Indeed, other variables-such as structural similarity-have also been claimed to account for differences between categories. For example, Humphreys, Riddoch, and Quinlan (1988) have argued that it is especially difficult to discriminate between different animals because of structural similarity within the category-that is, because most animals share many of the same visual features. Thus, the increased activation that we observe for animals in right occipital cortex may well be due to the extra visual processing required to be able to discriminate one animal from another. This does not imply any regional specialisation for object-specific attributes since this region was not selectively activated for animals in our previous study using the same semantic categorisation task with written words instead of pictures (Devlin et al., 2002b) . Instead, it suggests that this region was activated because of the nonspecific visual processing demands involved in processing pictures of animals. This claim is supported by data from Moore and Price (1999) showing that both animals and complex objects elicited additional activation in right medial extrastriate. Martin and Chao (2001) have raised the possibility that the stronger occipital activation for animals might reflect top-down modulation from more anterior temporal sites, implying that the meaning of the picture/object affects perceptual processing, and this interacts with category. Some recent studies of category-specific effects using ERPs render this hypothesis unlikely. Kiefer (2001) has reported that objects from natural kinds categories elicit early processing in occipital cortex. He found a larger N1 ERP component over inferior occipital sites compared to objects from artefact categories. This early N1 (obtained between 160-200 ms after target onset) is associated with perceptual processing (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991) . Since enhanced perceptual processing only occurred for pictures and not for written words, this suggests that it is associated specifically with processing the The detailed analysis of our activations, with reference to the claims made by Chao, Martin, and colleagues, concerning the distribution and processing of objects within different semantic categories, failed to find reliable differential activation for either animals or tools. This was the case in spite of the fact that we substantially lowered the threshold of our SPM maps and focused specifically on the neural regions they claim to be involved in category-specific processing. When we plotted the parameter estimates within the regions claimed by Chao et al. (1999) and Chao and Martin (2000) to constitute the neural pathway involved in the processing of animals and tools, in the majority of cases we found no differential effects whatsoever. On the rare occasion when we did see larger activation for one category compared to another this was only at a very low threshold and did not approach significance at a corrected level.
How do we account for the apparent discrepancy between the findings of the current experiment and those of Martin and colleagues (Martin & Chao, 1999) , who showed category-specific activations in a number of brain regions? While it is possible that there are systematic differences in the functional organisation of the different groups of subjects, we believe this to be highly unlikely. We must therefore confront two possible explanations. One is that our analysis has produced Type II error (i.e., false negatives). While our initial use of a stringent threshold does indeed carry with it the risk of failing to find activations, we feel that the second stage of our analysis, in which the threshold was lowered and the task-specific activity across separate regions was plotted, rules this out since not even a trend towards systematic category differences was observed. A further possibility is that our use of the PET technique is inherently less sensitive than fMRI, used by Martin et al. However, we think this an unlikely explanation since fMRI studies that we have carried out using the same tasks and materials as used in our PET studies show the lack of domain or category differences (Devlin et al., 2002b; Pilgrim, Fadili, Fletcher, & Tyler, 2002) . Moreover, a number of PET studies have reported category effects (Cappa, Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti, & Fazio, 1998; Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; Moore & Price, 1999; Perani et al., 1999) . The alternative explanation is that the reported category specificity arises from a Type I error (false positive). While Martin et al.' s analysis uses a similar implementation of the general linear model and parametric statistics to our own, one important issue concerns the extent to which individual variability has an influence on the group statistic. This is a major problem with fMRI and has led to the development of mixed effect modeling to validate group findings. Martin et al. conscientiously report the numbers of individual subjects who show category-specific effects. However, without further discussion and clarification of the group level analyses (including random effects), the possibility of Type I error arising from individual idiosyncrasies remains a possibility which must be excluded.
In conclusion, we found no evidence in this study for the claim that objects and entities are associated with differential activation in different neural regions. The only "category-specific" activation we found was in right occipital cortex, which was associated with the perceptual processing of the visual properties of pictures of animals. Our results are most consistent with the claim that conceptual knowledge is represented in a single distributed system which is not partitioned according to category or type of semantic knowledge ). This account predicts that the same semantic system will be activated whenever a word or object is processed, with some variation as a function of the nature of the input and the task that the subject is performing on that input. Thus, if the stimuli consist of pictures or objects, there may well be some category-specific regional specialisation in brain regions that process visual stimuli as a function of the differences in visual processing required for different objects, as we see in the present study. Similarly, if the task requires access to different levels of the conceptual representation (e.g., naming versus categorisation of an object), this may also generate apparent category-specific activations. 
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